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ABSTRACT Despite a large growth in domestic and international migration and 
remittances in recent decades, there are limited works that systematically identify and 
establish interactions between internal and international migration. Using primary data 
from new urban areas of Nepal, we identify households that had migrated from rural to 
urban areas, explore their migration practices and educational investment behaviors, and 
analyze the effects of international migration and remittances on investment in education. 
The results show that, despite their lower income and consumption, migrant households 
that have members abroad have higher human capital investment measured by the level 
and budget share of expenditure on children’s education and the time their children spend 
for studying at home than do urban-native and other types of migrant households. Our 
findings suggest that searching for better education is one important motivation for 
migrating to urban areas among rural households having members abroad. 
Keywords: rural-urban migration; international migration; remittances; educational 
investment, Nepal 
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1 Introduction 
In recent decades, the world has witnessed megatrends of migration and 
remittances. Approximately 700 million people are internal migrants, with most living in 
urban areas of developing countries (DCs), while 232 million people are international 
migrants, two-thirds from DCs (United Nations Population Division, 2011). In 2015, the 
global flow of remittances totaled $581.6 billion, of which almost three-fourths ($431.6 
billion) went to DCs (World Bank, 2016). In fact, remittances comprised the second-
largest external resource flow (after foreign direct investment) for DCs. Despite the 
growing literature on the nexus among migration, remittances, and development (de Hass, 
2010; Stark and Wang, 2002), few systematic attempts have been made to identify the 
interactions and linkages between internal and international migration that generally shape 
the direction and magnitude of development outcomes (for an exception, see Skeldon, 
2006). 
The main motivations for rural-urban migration are better employment and 
earnings (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Henderson, Shalizi and Venables, 2001), investment in 
physical and financial assets (Osili, 2004), and enjoyment of urban amenities (Fafchamps 
and Shilpi, 2013). Rapoport and Docquier (2006) theorize that international migration and 
remittances are: a mechanism for practicing altruism, that is, a desire to help members at 
home; insurance against risk and uncertainty for the household members left behind (Stark, 
1991; Stark and Bloom, 1985); and investment in physical and human capital, without 
credit constraints (Carelo, Bedi and Sparrow, 2009). However, very few studies have 
explored the role of migration in loosening information constraints; for example, migration 
as a medium for the acquisition and use of knowledge and skills (Ghimre and Maharjan, 
2015) and diffusion of learning and knowledge (2015; Williams and Baláž, 2008), as well 
as its role in information acquisition and transmission (Acharya and Leon-Gonzalez, 2014). 
International migration may induce information-constrained parents (e.g., uneducated 
mothers), who may otherwise underinvested in their children’s schooling, as theorized by 
Becker (1993), to enroll their children in school or transfer them from a public school to a 
private one (Acharya and Leon-Gonzalez, 2014). However, when the performance of 
public schools is poor and there are few private schools in rural areas, the rise in demand 
for better quality education may push rural households to search for quality education by 
migrating to nearby urban areas or capital cities, depending upon their preferences, 
proximity, and capabilities. The household migration may be easier if these households 
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receive non-wage income, such as international remittances. Nevertheless, to the best of 
our knowledge, educational investment behavior of migrant households in urban areas, 
who have members abroad and receive remittances, has not been explored. To fill that gap, 
this study explores how the desires of members of rural households receiving international 
remittances lead to migration to urban areas in search of better schools. We measure 
human-capital investment in terms of the absolute level, and budget share, of expenditure 
on children’s education and the time the children spend studying at home. Further, we 
analyze whether better education for children was a motivation for their migration to urban 
areas. 
We use primary household survey data collected from the newly developed urban 
areas of Nepal. This case is particularly interesting because, during the past two decades, 
Nepal has experienced significant progress in school enrollment and phenomenal growth 
in work-related foreign migration and remittance inflows as well as rural-urban family 
migration and urbanization. We find that rural-urban migrant families, particularly those 
who migrated recently and received international remittances, invest more on education 
and allocate a larger share of their budgets to it than urban natives with similar levels of 
education; they do so despite having a lower level of income and consumption. Moreover, 
the children of these migrant households spend more time studying at home than do 
children of urban-natives. While there may be other inherent reasons for migration, such as 
better earnings, consumption, and enjoyment of urban amenities, our findings suggest that 
the desire among recently arrived migrants to invest in quality schooling is one of the main 
motivations for their migration to urban areas, particularly if the household receives 
international remittances.  
We also observe that the quality of children’s education—a factor found to be 
crucial to productivity and economic growth (Barro, 1992; Hanushek and Woessamann, 
2008)—has become an increasingly important concern for migrant households. The 
findings may have a link with the higher expected return on investment in education, 
which in turn causes a “brain drain” (Beine, Docquierand Rapoport, 2001) to other 
countries, where the return on education is much higher than in Nepal and education is 
often a necessary condition for such migration; for instance, in the recruitment of Gurkhas 
in the British Army (Shrestha, 2017). However, migrants from information-constrained 
households may encounter severe problems while searching for safe and better jobs; 
consequently they may realize the importance of education and the returns possible in the 
global job market. In this line, Acharya and Leon-Gonzalez (2014) showed that children 
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from information-constrained households (poor, rural, or uneducated mother) improve 
education levels following the international migration of one member of the family, which 
is in contrast with the adverse effects of parental migration on children from rich, urban, 
and more educated households. Meanwhile, international remittances might have made the 
costly internal migration of rural households feasible by financing the costs of migration, 
settlement in urban areas, and education expenses. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an 
overview of recent political and socioeconomic changes, migration practices, and the 
educational system in Nepal. Section 3 describes the study’s survey methodology and data. 
Section 4 discusses the estimation models. Section 5 presents the results, discussion, and 
robustness checks. Section 6 concludes the paper with policy implications. 
2 Socioeconomic Settings, Migration Practices, and Educational Systems in Nepal 
Contemporary Nepalese society is characterized by a unique socioeconomic and 
political transition. First, Nepal experienced political openness through the restoration of 
multiparty democracy in 1990 after the demise of the three-decade party-less Panchayat 
regime along with the adoption of a liberal economic policy that encouraged private sector 
engagement in education and health services and facilitated open trade and out-migration. 
In 2006, Nepal experienced another political change that transformed a decade-long 
Maoist insurgency (1996–2006) into a peace process and paved the way for restructuring 
the unitary state into a federal one. These changes allowed a broader participation by more 
than 125 castes and ethnic groups and 123 linguistic groups in the governance and 
development processes. 
Second, Nepal experienced phenomenal growth in migration, driven by foreign 
employment opportunities, resulting in remittance inflows to Nepal. Annual emigration 
from Nepal, excluding migration to India, increased from less than 10,000 people in the 
early 1990s to 418,713 people in 2015–16.1It is estimated that at least one-third of all 
Nepalese households have at least one family member living abroad for employment or 
education (CBS, 2011), mainly in Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab 
Emirates. The recorded annual remittance inflows to Nepal increased from $50 million in 
early 1990s to $6.73 billion in 2015, with the ratio of remittance inflows to gross domestic 
product (GDP) increasing from 2 percent to 32.2 percent, making Nepal the largest 
remittances recipient, relative to the size of the economy (World Bank, 2016). 
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Third, Nepal has made remarkable progress with regard to access to education, 
despite its slow economic growth and political transition. Net primary school enrollment 
increased from 64 percent in 1990 to 96.6 percent in 2015–16 (National Planning 
Commission, 2016). Focusing on knowledge of English, private sector involvement in 
education has increased sharply, from less than 5 percent in 1990 to 27 percent in 2010–11, 
with 56 percent of students enrolled in private schools in urban areas in contrast to 20 
percent in rural areas (CBS, 2011). 
There are considerable differences in the quality and costs of education between 
public and private schools. In general, the academic performance of public school students 
is worse than those in private schools. For instance, the pass rate in the School Leaving 
Certificate (SLC) exam in 2015 for public school students was 33.7 percent, compared to 
89.8 percent for private school students. Among the students who passed, only 32.1 
percent of public school students secured a first-division or distinction level, while the 
corresponding figure for private school students was 86.4 percent (MOE, 2015).  
Private school fees in Nepal are paid almost entirely by the parents, unlike that in 
religious or other private schools in other countries. Our survey data show that average 
household expenditure on education per child in a private school ($221) is almost four 
times higher than that in a public school ($58).  
Fourth, Nepal has experienced remarkable urbanization in recent decades. The 
number of municipalities increased from 33 in 1986 to 58 in 1997 and to 217 in 2015. 
Accordingly, the share of the urban population increased from 9.1 percent in 1991 to 14.2 
percent in 2001 and to 41.8 percent in 2015.2 The major factor behind this growth, as in 
other DCs, could be rural-urban migration (Lucas, 1997). It is believed that many rural 
households, particularly those that receive a large amount of international remittances, 
have been moving to urban areas—local and newly developed urban centers, district 
headquarters, regional cities, and the capital city and its suburbs—depending on 
affordability, preferences, and access to better education, health services, and other 
facilities.  
3 Household Survey and Study Area 
The paper uses data collected by the first author of the Nepal Remittance 
Investments and Urbanization Survey (NERIUS) in late 2011. The survey defines the 41 
new urban areas, which were declared municipalities by the government of Nepal (GoN) 
in mid-July 2011, as its study area.3 These municipalities are heterogeneously distributed 
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across the country and represent newly flourishing small urban areas; they also capture the 
general pattern of recent rural–urban migration.  
The survey adopted a three-stage stratified random sampling method. In the first 
stage, we randomly chose 12 urban areas, representing all three ecological belts and five 
development regions, based on their population shares in 2001 (see Figure 1). 4 In the 
second stage, based on discussions with local authorities, facilitators, and community 
leaders, the wards of each sample municipality were categorized into three broad groups: 
core, characterized mainly by urban activities and the possibility of in-migration; 
intermediate, characterized by both urban and rural activities and might have experienced 
in-migration; and periphery, characterized mainly by agricultural activities and hardly 
experienced in-migration. One ward each from the core and intermediate groups of the 12 
urban areas was randomly chosen as a primary sampling unit (PSU), producing 24 PSUs in 
the survey. 
In the third stage, household rosters for each PSU were prepared. They included 
data on: household head; household size; whether the household had arrived in the study 
area after 2001; and the number of household members who lived abroad. Based on this 
information, the listed households were categorized into two groups: urban-native 
households (those who arrived in the municipality before 2002) and migrant households 
(those who arrived in the municipality after 2001). Each group of households was further 
divided into two categories, depending on whether at least one family member was living 
abroad. From these four strata, 12 households in each PSU (288 sample households) were 
randomly selected such that, as far as possible, at least 50 percent each were migrant 
households and had members living abroad. Table 1 presents the regional and ethnic 
distribution of the households. 
//Table 1 about here// 
4 Model 
We hypothesize a model to establish a linkage between international remittances 
and rural-urban migration considering recent migration practice in Nepal. We assume that 
rural-urban migrant households generally make at least three decisions on migration and 
investment in human capital. First, rural households send their adult members abroad for 
employment and earning. Remittance income and increased knowledge about the returns 
to schooling may create demand for high-quality education, even though such demand 
might be unmet in rural areas due to the scarcity of high-quality schools. Second, the 
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demand-supply mismatch in rural areas may cause rural households receiving remittances 
to migrate to urban areas depending upon their preferences, proximity, and ability to 
finance the cost of family migration. Third, migrant households make educational 
investment decisions, such as the types and quality of schools and expenditure amount. 
Thus, the household decision model is R�� = F(H�, C�, G�)                                                                (1) M�� = F(R��,  H�, C�, G� )                                                        (2) EDU� = F(R��, M��, H�, C�, G� )                                               (3) 
where Rf, Md, and EDU are decisions on sending a member abroad who will send 
back remittances, migration of household from rural to urban areas, and investment in 
children's education, respectively. Besides household (H), community (C), and 
geographical (G) attributes, the household decision on migration from rural to urban areas 
is determined by remittances received (Rf), while educational investment is determined by 
the remittances received (Rf) and decision to migrate from rural to urban areas (Md).  
As described in Section 3, the survey covers urban areas that had witnessed 
migration from rural households in recent years but does not collect information on the 
migrants’ households in the rural areas of origin. So, we cannot estimate Model (2) 
directly. However, we implicitly estimate Models (2) and (3) using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) with specification (4). Moreover, due to the limitations of the OLS methodology, 
we also estimate Tobit and Hurdle (Two-part) models (see Appendix A.1 for a detailed 
description of these models). We estimate the models separately for households receiving 
and not receiving international remittances to capture the impact of international migration 
and remittances on educational investment. We model education investment as: 
EDUINV� = β� + β�M�� + β�EXP� +  β�H� + β�C� +  β�G� +  ε�    (4) 
where the dependent variable, EDUINVi, is household investment on education measured 
as the natural logarithm of household expenditure on education (EDUEXPi)5 for school-
age children (in age group 5–24 years) or its share (EDUSHAREi) of the household’s total 
consumption (see appendix Table A.1 for definitions and constructions of variables). εi is 
an error term with zero mean. The model is estimated for the subsample of households that 
have at least one school-age child for the full sample, and separately for households that 
received or did not receive international remittances in the survey year.  
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Among the explanatory variables, Mid, the variable of interest in this study, is a 
dummy variable for migrant households, equal to one if a household arrived in the PSU 
after 2001 and zero otherwise. EXPi is the natural logarithm of household consumption, 
used as a proxy for household permanent income, as in the literature on the estimation of 
Engel curves. 6  Hi is a vector of household characteristics, including human capital, 
measured as the years of schooling of the most educated member of the household who is 
at least 25 years old 7  and household demographics measured as household size and 
composition. Ci, composed of a set of caste/ethnicity dummy variables, is used to control 
for differences in human and physical asset endowments and preferences with regard to 
schooling among castes and ethnic groups. Finally, Gi, a set of dummies for development 
regions, is used to control for spatial differences in access to, and preference regarding, 
education. 
At the child level, we estimate the following human capital investment model using 
OLS, Tobit, and two-part (hurdle) specifications: 
CEDU� = γ� + γ�M�� + γ�EXP� +  γ�CP� + γ�CH� + γ�C� +  γ�G� +  ε�   (5) 
whereCEDUj, the dependent variable, is (i) CEDUEXPj, the natural logarithm of 
expenditure on the education of child j8 or (ii) CTIMEj, the number of hours that child j 
spent studying at home during the past seven days. We estimate this model in a manner 
similar to that used for household-level models for the full sample of children (in age 
group 5–24 years), and separately for subsamples of children categorized according to 
their household having received international remittances during the survey year. εj is the 
error term with zero mean. 
The explanatory variables (Mj, EXPj, Cj, and Gj) are the same as in Model (4). CPj 
is a vector of child characteristics, such as dummies for age cohort and sex, birth order, 
and dummies for the maximum educational level of the child’s parents. CHj is the natural 
logarithm of household size. 
Limitations of the study 
Household decisions on migration, remittances, and educational investment may be 
endogenous. First, sending a member abroad for employment and the migration of a 
household to urban areas might depend on observed and unobserved individual and 
household characteristics that also affect educational investment, which might cause an 
endogeneity bias. Second, remittance income and investment decisions may be 
9 
 
endogenous because of the unobserved attributes, preferences, patience, and risk aversion 
of parents, the simultaneity of migration, remittances and children’s education, and reverse 
causality. If we do not account for these issues properly, our estimates may be inconsistent 
and biased. Our survey data cover only the urban areas, where rural households have 
recently migrated, and do not cover the rural households. This limitation did not allow us 
to use the rural households in the areas of origin of migrants as a comparison group to 
estimate the migration decision, and find appropriate and valid instruments. Thus, we 
could not jointly estimate equations (1), (2), and (3) using three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
estimates considering the endogeneity of migration and remittances. However, we take 
these concerns into account when analyzing and interpreting our results.  
5 Results 
Descriptive results 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the size, composition, and education of the 
sample households. Among migrant households, the average time elapsed since their 
arrival from their hometown village is 4.95 years. On average, remittance-receiving 
migrant households arrived later than non-receiving migrant households. Among 
remittance-receiving migrant households, 79 percent had sent their members abroad prior 
to migration to urban areas, and 21 percent had sent them after their arrival.  
// Table 2 about here // 
The education levels of the most-educated household members were similar among 
urban-native and migrant households. However, among remittance non-receiving 
households, urban-natives were more educated than migrant ones, in contrast to 
remittance-receiving households. The proportion of young children (under 10 years) was 
higher among migrant households than urban-natives, while urban-natives had a higher 
proportion of older children (age group 11–24 years). The average number of children 
attending school was similar for both urban-natives and migrant households. However, 
migrant households were more likely to send their children to private schools than urban-
natives; there is a large difference in private school enrolment between migrant and urban-
native households in the subsample of remittance-receiving households.  
Table 3 shows the differences in household income and consumption between 
migrant and urban-natives. Migrant households had lower levels of welfare measured by 
both average household income (panel A) and average household consumption (panel B) 
than urban-natives in the full sample and the sub-samples of remittance-receiving and non-
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receiving households. Foreign remittances constituted only 14 percent of the income of 
urban-natives but 30 percent of the income of migrant households. In the subsample of 
remittance-receiving households, remittance income constituted about 40 percent of 
income for urban-natives and 63 percent for migrant households, implying that remittance 
of earnings is a main source of income for migrant households. Remittance-receiving 
households generally had higher incomes than did non-receiving households but similar 
level of consumption, regardless of their being urban-native or migrant households. This 
suggests that remittance-receiving households saved or invested more in physical assets 
than non-receiving households.  
// Table 3 about here // 
Table 3 (panel B) shows the distribution of consumption among four categories. 
The food expenditure share was larger for migrant households than for urban-natives, 
regardless of remittances receipt. However, the average propensity to spend on non-food 
items and durable services was higher for urban-natives than migrant households, implying 
that migrants, particularly remittance-receiving ones, enjoy fewer urban amenities than 
urban-natives. Most importantly, remittance-receiving migrant households allocated a far 
larger absolute amount and budget share to education than did urban-natives, which is in 
line with the argument hypothesized in equation (3). These results are consistent with the 
pattern of school attendance (see Table 2) and the finding of De and Ratha (2012) that 
favorable effect of remittances on education among children in Sri Lanka, and that by 
Ngoma and Ismail (2013) among children in 89 developing countries. 
Regression estimates 
Determinants of financial investment in children’s education 
This subsection presents the estimates of education expenditure and its share of the 
budget. Table 4 summarizes the OLS, Tobit, and hurdle estimates for the natural logarithm 
of household expenditure on education. The coefficients of the OLS estimates 
(specifications [1] through [3]) and the conditional marginal effects of the Tobit estimates 
(specifications [4] through [6]) indicate that migrant households spend more on education 
than do urban-natives. However, the estimates are significant for the full sample and the 
subsample of remittance-receiving households but not for the subsample of non-receiving 
households.9 For instance, based on OLS estimates for the full sample, migrant households 
spend 126 percent more than do urban-natives10; for the subsample of remittance-receiving 
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households, migrant households spend 209 percent more than urban-natives. The Tobit 
estimates are greater than the OLS estimates, suggesting that the OLS estimates are biased 
downward. 
//Table 4 about here// 
The estimates for the hurdle models (Table 4, specifications [7] through [12]) also 
support the OLS and Tobit estimates. The probability of having a positive expenditure on 
education is similar for urban-natives and migrant households in the full sample—migrant 
households have lower probability of having education expenditure in the subsample of 
remittance non-receiving households while the opposite is true in the subsample of 
remittance-receiving households. The education expenditure conditional on the household 
with positive education expenditure is higher for migrant households in all specifications 
and is statistically significant for all except the subsample of remittance non-receiving 
households. These results suggest that the higher level of investment in education among 
migrant households than urban-natives is due to both a greater likelihood of a positive and 
a higher level of spending on education among remittance-receiving households than non-
receiving ones. 
Table 5 summarizes the estimates for the household budget share of education. The 
OLS, Tobit, and hurdle model estimation results are qualitatively similar to the estimates 
on expenditure amount (see Table 4) in terms of both sign and statistical significance but 
larger in magnitude. This suggests that remittance-receiving migrant households spend 
more on education and allocate a larger budget share for education than do urban-natives 
and non-receiving migrant households. 
//Table 5 about here// 
Regarding other covariates, income elasticity (consumption as a proxy) is 
statistically significant for all estimates of education expenditure (see Table 4, 
specifications [1] through [12]). However, the estimates are positive but not statistically 
significant for education’s share of the budget (see Table 5), which implies that despite 
rich households spending more on education, they may not allocate a larger share of their 
budgets to education than poor households. In other words, poor households strive to 
provide for their children’s education despite their lower level of asset endowment, 
earnings, and current consumption. The education of household member has a (always) 
positive and (usually) statistically significant effect on education expenditure and its share 
of the budget, with larger effects in the subsample of remittance-receiving households. 
Household size has a positive but statistically insignificant effect on education expenditure 
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and its share of the budget. Education expenditure and its share of the budget increase 
along with the proportion of school-aged children, as expected. 
Table 6 summarizes the estimates of education expenditure at the child level. The 
OLS and Tobit estimates for the full sample (specifications [1] and [4]) and the subsample 
of remittance-receiving households (specifications [3] and [6]) show that children from 
migrant households have a statistically significantly higher level of education expenditure 
than do children from urban-natives. In the full sample, children from migrant households 
spend 106 percent more on education than do children from non-migrant households 
(specification [1]). In the subsample of children from remittance-receiving households, 
children from migrant households spend 236 percent more on education than do children 
from non-migrant households (specification [3]). The coefficients of the double-hurdle 
models suggest that the differences in education expenditure arise from the higher 
likelihood of positive education expenditure among migrant households, in particular 
remittance-receiving ones, than among urban-natives (specifications [7] and [11]). This 
suggests that children from migrant households, particularly from those that receive 
international remittances, are more likely to be enrolled in school than children from 
urban-natives (similar to Table 2, panel B). 
//Table 6 about here// 
Table 6 also shows that children of the primary age cohort (5–10 years) have a 
higher level of expenditure on education than do children of the secondary (11 –16 years) 
and tertiary (17–24 years) age cohorts, due to higher school enrollment and a greater 
likelihood of enrollment in private schools (specifications [7] and [8]). This implies an 
increasing recognition among parents of the value of, and return on, education over time. 
Children of more educated parents have much higher education expenditure. The effect of 
parental education is stronger and greater for children of remittance-receiving households 
than for children of non-receiving households, revealing the higher importance attached to 
children’s schooling by remittance-receiving ones. However, there is an acute gender gap 
in educational investment. On average, parents make about double the education 
expenditure on boys than on girls; the difference is even higher in the subsample of 
children of remittance-receiving households, possibly due to the better job prospects for 
boys in Nepal and abroad (Vogel and Korinek, 2012). 
Thus, our results—regardless of the model specification—show differences in 
educational expenditures between rural-urban migrant households and urban-native 
households; remittance-receiving migrant households have larger educational expenditure 
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than other types of migrant households and urban-natives, which is consistent with the 
higher private school enrolment among such households (see Table 2). 
Determinants of time allocation for children’s education 
This subsection presents the results of the estimation of the time children spend 
studying at home. Table 7 summarizes the OLS, Tobit, and hurdle model estimates of 
weekly hours spent studying at home by children aged 5 to 24. The coefficients of the OLS 
estimates (specifications [1] through [3]) and the conditional marginal effects of the Tobit 
estimates (specifications [4] through [6]) indicate that children from migrant households 
spend more time studying at home than do children from urban-natives. However, those 
estimates are statistically significant only for the full sample and the subsample of 
remittance-receiving households. According to the OLS estimates, in the full sample, 
children from migrant households spend 2.37 hours more studying at home than do 
children from urban-natives, while, in the subsample of remittance-receiving households, 
children from migrant households spend 3.48 more hours studying at home than do 
children from urban-native households. 
//Table 7 about here// 
The hurdle model estimates (Table 7, specifications [7] through [12]) also support 
the OLS and Tobit estimates. The probability of spending time studying at home is 
significantly higher for children from migrant households than for children from urban-
natives, in both the full sample and the subsample of remittance-receiving households, but 
is insignificant in the subsample of non-receiving households. The number of hours 
children spend studying at home, conditional on time allocation, is greater for migrant 
households in all specifications but is statistically significant only for the full sample.  
Table 7 also shows that children from affluent households spend more time 
studying at home than do children from poor households in most of the specifications. 
Children from large households generally spend less time studying at home than do 
children from small households, possibly because parents of small families place greater 
importance on education. Secondary school-age cohort children spend more time studying 
at home than do primary school-age cohort children. However, tertiary school-age cohort 
children spend less time studying at home than do primary school-age cohort children, 
possibly due to their having left school or gained employment. Boys spend more time 
studying at home than do girls, revealing discrimination in intra-household labor allocation. 
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More educated parents allow their children to spend more time studying in both the full 
sample and the subsample of remittance-receiving household children. 
Robustness of findings 
There are three major concerns about the robustness of our results. The first 
concern is whether our finding on the human capital investment motivation is robust to 
alternative assumptions regarding the unobserved characteristics of migrant households. 
For example, it might be argued that households might have reasons other than their 
children’s education (e.g., enjoyment of urban life, urban jobs) for migration to urban areas. 
We do not reject the hypothesis of migration for employment, earning, and consumption of 
urban amenities but argue that children’s schooling is also an important motivation for 
their migration. For instance, if an urban lifestyle motivation is more important than 
children’s education for these households, these households may have higher consumption 
levels for food and non-food items and may use more urban amenities and entertainment 
than other types of migrant and urban-native households. Moreover, if employment in 
urban areas is the only motivation for their migration, remittance receiving migrant 
households may spend more time earning a wage and less time on their children's 
education than other types of migrant or urban-native households. By contrast, the results 
show that migrant households who receive international remittances have lower wage 
earnings and spent significantly a smaller proportion of their total expenditure on food and 
non-food items than urban-natives and other types of migrant households. In addition, 
mothers from these households allocate more time to their children’s education than urban-
native or other types of migrant households (results available upon request). Moreover, we 
estimated the model by excluding households that have members who migrated to India to 
examine whether households whose members work in India incur similar expenditure on 
education. The results are similar in terms of sign and significance, but smaller in 
magnitude than our main results. This is because the proportion of households with 
members working in India is higher among urban-native than migrant households. We also 
estimate multinomial Logit models (Table A.3 in the appendix) to explain the three 
choices of no enrollment, enrollment in a private school, and enrolment in a public school. 
We find that migrant households who receive international remittances are significantly 
less likely to keep their children out of school and significantly more likely to enroll them 
in private schools, while controlling for consumption and other characteristics. Therefore, 
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it appears that searching for better education for children is one of the important reasons 
for migration of rural households that receive international remittances.  
The second concern is whether our main findings hold true if we relax the 
definition of migrant households and whether the motivation of migrant households 
depends on the period during which they arrived. While defining a migrant household, we 
assumed that the households that arrived at least ten years ago are fully assimilated in 
urban areas, and accordingly, we defined them as urban-native households. In addition, 
during the decade-long Maoist conflict (1996–2006), many rural individuals and families 
were forced to migrate to other rural and urban areas of Nepal or abroad (Bohra-Mishra 
and Massey, 2011). So, we test whether our main results hold true when we relax the 
definition of migration household and consider reasons for any forced migration by 
defining households that arrived after 1990 as migrant households and creating three 
dummies.11 The results are consistent with the main findings (see appendix Table A.4). 
Pre-conflict migrant households invest less in education than do urban-natives, while both 
in-conflict and post-conflict migrant households invest more (although statistically 
insignificant) on education (panel A and B).These results are qualitatively similar to the 
estimation of educational expenditure at the child level (panel C). In addition, we estimate 
model (4) by considering households that migrated after 1990 as migrant households and 
dividing them into three groups—households that migrated only after sending a member 
abroad, households that migrated before sending a member abroad, and migrant 
households with no member abroad (appendix Table A.5). The results show that migrant 
households with member(s) abroad have a higher level of expenditure on education than 
other types of migrant households and urban-natives. Meanwhile, the coefficients are 
statistically significant and larger in magnitude for the households that sent a member 
abroad before migrating to urban areas than the households that sent a member only after 
arriving in the urban areas. The results are consistent with the argument that education is a 
motivation for migration to urban areas for rural households that have members abroad. 
Third, we check whether expenditure on private schooling reflects the intent to 
invest in higher-quality education. The questionnaire used in this study asked household 
heads their opinions about private schools and reasons for sending their children to these 
schools. The survey reveals that quality was a major reason for choosing private schools. 
For 61 percent of the households that send at least one child to private schools, one of the 
following was the main reason for choosing such schools, all of which pertain to quality: 
teachers make more effort in teaching (32%); classes are regular in school (19%); and 
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children put more effort in private school (10%). The offering of English classes (23%) 
was another important reason. As expected, the demonstration effect (11%), that is, 
following the advice of relatives, neighbors, and friendswas not a very important factor in 
the decision. These views are well-supported by the differences between the SLC 
examination results of public schools and private schools (see Section 2). In addition, 
private schooling was more common for primary school-age cohort than for the secondary 
school-age cohort, suggesting a growing trend for private schooling. 
 The findings above are consistent with the brain drain hypothesis mentioned earlier, 
and is amplified among migrant households via information acquisition and remittance-
financed rural-urban migration. Parents are increasingly investing in higher-quality 
education, perhaps anticipating higher returns to education in the global market, despite 
uncertainty in the domestic environment. In addition, the robustness checks are consistent 
with our argument and validate the hypothesis that investment in higher-quality education 
of children is an important motivation for migration to urban areas among rural households 
receiving international remittances. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper analyzed the effects of international migration and remittances on the 
human-capital investment behavior of rural-urban migrant households. We considered the 
level and budget share of expenditure on children’s education and the time their children 
spend studying at home as indicators of human capital investment. We tested whether 
search for better education was an important motivation for migration of international 
remittance-receiving rural households to urban areas. The results showed that despite 
having lower levels of income and consumption, the rural-urban migrant households that 
receive international remittances spend, on average, three times more on education and 
allocate a larger share of their budgets to education than urban-natives and other types of 
migrant households. In addition, children from these migrant households spend more time 
studying at home than children from other types of households. These findings suggest that 
an important motivation for rural-urban migration is the search for human-capital 
investment. This is because of the assumption that the international migration exposes 
households to observe higher returns to quality education in international labor markets, 
and international remittances help finance the costs of both rural-urban migration and 
children’s education. Our findings imply that income level is not the primary factor for 
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investments in children’s education; rather, exposure to global employment opportunities 
and increased importance of quality education may be the main factors.  
Understanding the human-capital investment behavior of rural-urban migrant 
households may help policy makers to review the existing migration policy of Nepal for 
getting maximum benefits from the international labor markets. Strategies that focus on 
providing information about the costs of, and returns to, education in local and global labor 
markets may be crucial for achieving optimal investment in children’s schooling. In 
addition, providing incentives, such as education vouchers, establishment of vocational 
schools and colleges, and upgrading facilities of public schools, particularly in rural areas, 
may supplement in achieving more equitable and optimal, educational outcomes.
                                                          
1 Data are taken from the Department of Foreign Employment of Nepal (2016). Under a reciprocal agreement 
between Nepal and India, the Nepalese can enter India through an open border and work there without a visa. 
Therefore, estimating the annual flow of the Nepalese people to India is difficult. It is estimated that more than 
2 million Nepalese migrants live in India. 
2 Figures are based on Nepal’s population censuses for 1991, 2001, and 2011. 
3 The GoN’s declaration was not implemented immediately. Rather, in July 2014, the GoN declared 72 new 
municipalities, including 41 urban areas surveyed in this study. An additional 61 municipalities were declared 
in December 2014 and 26 municipalities in September 2015. 
4 During the survey, CBS had released the preliminary results of the 2011 population censusonly up to the 
district level; therefore, we could not obtain data at the local administrative (village development committee or 
municipality) level. Instead, we used data from the 2001 population census to prepare the primary sampling 
frame. 
5 We use the natural logarithm of one plus EDUEXP as a dependent variable to avoid missing values while 
taking the log. 
6 Following Deaton and Zaidi (2002), we calculated household income and consumption (see Table A.1 in the 
appendix). We allowed for the nonlinearity of consumption by including its squared and cubed terms, but those 
did not generate statistically significant coefficients. Therefore, we proceeded with a linear Engel curve. 
7 We assume that school-aged children (5–24 years) are less likely to engage in income-earning activities. 
Accordingly, their education level should not directly affect the household’s current income but may affect the 
household’s future income. Therefore, in calculating the years of schooling of the most educated adult member 
of the household, we excluded school-age children. The results using the years of schooling of the most 
educated member of the household aged 17 or above (not reported here) are robust to our main results shown in 
Table 4, but the R2 is drastically smaller. 
8 We used the natural logarithm of one plus CEDU as a dependent variable to avoid the problem of missing 
values while taking log. 
9 Alternatively, we also estimated the model in the subsample of households with members abroad and not. The 
results, reported in the appendix (Table A.2), are consistent with our main findings. Similarly, we also defined 
households having a returned or current international migrant member(s) as household with international 
migrants and estimated the model in the subsample of households with migrant members abroad and not. 
Again, the results were found to be consistent with our main findings. 
10 According to Kennedy (1981), it would not be correct to interpret the coefficient of the migration dummy 
(0.873) as migrant households spending 87.3 percent more expenditure on education than non-migrant 
households, other things being equal. Instead, following the formula proposed by Kennedy, it would be more 
accurate to state that the migrant households have 126 percent [i.e. 100(exp(0.873-0.5(0.342))-
1)=125.96%]higher expenditure on education than non-migrant households, other things being equal. 
11 Three dummies—prior-conflict migrant households (those that arrived in the urban area between 1991 and 
1995), in-conflict migrant households (those that arrived in the urban area between 1996 and 2006), and post-
conflict migrant households (those that arrived in the urban area after 2006)—are used for migrant households 
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with a dummy for urban-native households (including those arrived in the urban area before 1991) as the base 
category. 
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Table 1.  Sampling Distribution of Households 
  
Urban-native households   Migrant households 
Having members 
abroad 
No member 
abroad   
Having 
members abroad 
No member 
abroad 
      
A. Full study area      
No of households in sampling frame 1,728 4,520  640 1,808 
No of sample households 64 113  53 58 
Percent of sample households in 
sampling frame 19.87 51.98  7.36 20.79 
      
B. Ecological Belt  
(Distribution by household types)      
Mountains 13.36 81.23  1.08 4.33 
Hills 21.05 47.65  7.25 24.05 
Tarai 19.60 52.25  8.31 19.85 
     
C. Development Region  
(Distribution by household types)      
Eastern  18.95 50.83  6.77 23.46 
Central 16.86 55.97  7.12 20.05 
Western  25.28 39.06  11.66 24.00 
Mid-Western  13.34 56.61  5.99 24.06 
Far-Western  26.45 67.15  0.62 5.79 
Note.The sampling frame is the household roster prepared at PSU level and includes 8,696 households. A migrant household is defined as a 
household arrived in the PSU (primary sampling unit) only after 2001. The households arrived before 2001 are considered as urban native 
households.
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Table 2. Household Composition and Education by Migration and International Remittances 
Variable 
All households   Households not receiving international remittances   
Households receiving 
international remittances 
Urban-
native Migrant   
Urban-
native Migrant   
Urban-
native Migrant 
         
Years Since Migration (YSM) n.a. 4.95  n.a. 5.28  n.a. 4.58 
         
A. Household size and composition         
Household size 4.95 4.08  5.23 3.97  4.45 4.21 
Household size§ 6.15 5.27  6.11 4.55  6.23 6.06 
Proportion of children         
aged 0-4 0.08 0.09  0.08 0.09  0.08 0.08 
aged 5-10 0.11 0.17  0.11 0.16  0.10 0.17 
aged 11-16 0.13 0.11  0.15 0.10  0.11 0.12 
aged 17-24 0.19 0.18  0.19 0.18  0.19 0.17 
Proportion of adult  men aged 25-64 0.22 0.25  0.19 0.25  0.27 0.24 
Proportion of adult women aged 25-64 0.22 0.19  0.23 0.19  0.21 0.19 
Proportion of elderly (64+) 0.05 0.02  0.06 0.03  0.05 0.02 
         
B. Education         
Years of schooling of the most educated 
adult member (aged 25 and above) 8.84 8.73  8.87 8.16  8.80 9.36 
No of children (aged 5-24) in         
School 1.70 1.70  1.88 1.52  1.39 1.91 
Public/Community school 0.88 0.65  1.04 0.71  0.59 0.58 
Private school 0.82 1.05  0.84 0.81  0.80 1.32 
         
No of households (N) 177 111   113 58   64 53 
Note.See Table 1 notes. § Including absent members also. 
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Table 3. Household Income and Consumption by Migration and Remittances 
Variable 
All households   Households not receiving international remittances   
Households receiving 
international remittances 
Urban 
native Migrant   
Urban 
native Migrant   
Urban 
native Migrant 
         
A: Income (NPR thousand)         
Household income 380.46 301.69  340.18 251.42  451.57 356.69 
Per capita income 92.65 82.26  74.45 76.95  124.78 88.08 
Foreign remittance 
income 53.23 90.90  0.00 0.00  174.71 225.11 
         
C: Consumption  
(NPR thousand)         
Household consumption 260.22 212.61  266.36 203.42  249.38 222.67 
Per capita consumption 62.16 55.69  60.41 55.46  65.23 55.95 
         
D: Consumption by 
categories (NPR 
thousand)         
Food 99.65 89.67  101.62 84.70  96.18 95.11 
 (41.33) (44.78)  (40.56) (43.65)  (42.70) (46.02) 
Non-food 128.66 90.91 130.84 89.56 124.79 92.38 
 (47.78) (41.08)  (47.90) (42.88)  (47.57) (39.12) 
Durable services 10.76 8.30  12.00 9.75  8.58 6.72 
 (3.30) (3.54)  (3.72) (4.34)  (2.56) (2.67) 
Education 21.02 23.64  21.77 19.32  19.71 28.37 
 (7.59) (10.59)  (7.83) (9.13)  (7.17) (12.19) 
      
No of households (N) 177 111   113 58   64 53 
Note.See Table 1. See Appendix (Table A.1) for construction of variables. 
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Table 4. OLS, Tobit and Two-Part Estimates of Natural Logarithm of Household Expenditure on Education (Household Level) 
Variables 
A. OLS Model  B. Tobit Model  C. Two-Part Model 
All Remittance non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient All 
Remittance 
non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient All Remittance non-recipient Remittance recipient 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Condi. Mar. effect 
Condi. Mar. 
effect 
Condi. 
Mar. effect 
Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS 
Mar. effect Coeff. Mar. effect Coeff. Mar. effect Coeff. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
   
 
   
 
      
Migrant household (M) 0.873** 0.431 1.326**  0.958** 0.471 1.465**  0.013 0.284*** -0.050* 0.225 0.275** 0.211* 
 (0.340) (0.482) (0.634)  (0.396) (0.486) (0.631)  (0.028) (0.096) (0.027) (0.155) (0.119) (0.120) 
Log of household expenditure 2.047*** 1.900*** 2.261***  2.173*** 1.956*** 2.453***  0.119*** 0.998*** 0.180*** 0.965*** 0.254** 1.004*** 
 (0.465) (0.721) (0.702)  (0.463) (0.594) (0.726)  (0.038) (0.122) (0.057) (0.196) (0.100) (0.164) 
Years of schooling of the most 
educated adult aged 25 0.117*** 0.042 0.198**  0.130*** 0.045 0.225**  0.004 0.034*** -0.000 0.026* 0.016** 0.056*** 
 (0.043) (0.056) (0.085)  (0.046) (0.051) (0.085)  (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.014) (0.007) (0.018) 
Log of household size 0.493 0.206 0.169  0.572 0.268 0.230  -0.041 0.031 -0.104* -0.065 -0.093 -0.014 
 (0.483) (0.744) (0.790)  (0.501) (0.619) (0.798)  (0.042) (0.133) (0.054) (0.209) (0.077) (0.168) 
Proportion of children aged 0-4 -4.483 -5.775 -0.606  -5.235** -6.550** -1.172  -0.205 -0.163 0.235 -0.676  1.130 
 (2.838) (3.955) (4.133)  (2.648) (3.066) (4.513)  (0.164) (0.736) (0.191) (1.102)  (0.989) 
Proportion of children aged 5-10 8.188*** 4.768 13.162***  8.859*** 4.957 14.570***  1.423*** 1.598** 1.748*** 0.986  3.015*** 
 (2.665) (3.973) (3.253)  (2.596) (3.105) (3.974)  (0.304) (0.694) (0.502) (1.048)  (0.891) 
Proportion of children aged 11-
16 3.867 2.350 6.801**  4.100* 2.375 7.374**  0.279* 1.238* 0.453** 0.683 -0.369** 2.561*** 
 (2.616) (3.945) (3.104)  (2.408) (2.916) (3.702)  (0.165) (0.650) (0.185) (1.002) (0.162) (0.826) 
Proportion of children aged 17-
24 3.070 1.630 3.685  3.276 1.570 4.153  0.174 1.187* 0.549** 0.654 -0.925*** 2.231*** 
 (2.405) (3.689) (3.059)  (2.452) (2.966) (3.672)  (0.178) (0.649) (0.215) (1.003) (0.209) (0.799) 
Proportion of working age men 
(25-64)  0.470 2.199 1.300  0.611 2.508 1.530  0.042 -0.437 0.467** -1.075 -1.086*** 0.238 
 (2.874) (3.956) (4.235)  (2.692) (3.295) (4.043)  (0.190) (0.724) (0.210) (1.102) (0.320) (0.917) 
Proportion of working age 
women (25-64) 3.826 5.457 -0.287  4.225 5.845* -0.306  0.162 0.401 1.169*** -0.139 -0.256 1.686* 
 (2.440) (3.392) (3.862)  (2.849) (3.359) (4.569)  (0.188) (0.736) (0.399) (1.106) (0.345) (0.975) 
Caste/Ethnicity 
              
Brahmin-Hills  0.447 -0.412 0.639  0.528 -0.426 0.755  0.022 -0.066 -0.001 0.003  -0.022 
 (0.567) (0.630) (0.839)  (0.636) (0.765) (0.998)  (0.033) (0.116) (0.032) (0.175)  (0.157) 
Brahmin-Tarai 0.133 -0.303 1.861  0.147 -0.353 2.081        
 (0.622) (0.722) (1.351)  (0.923) (0.978) (1.932)        
Chhetri 0.272 -0.033 -0.312  0.314 -0.025 -0.315  0.017 0.117 -0.015 0.202 -0.042 0.155 
 (0.489) (0.473) (0.909)  (0.596) (0.745) (0.901)  (0.031) (0.105) (0.032) (0.162) (0.051) (0.140) 
Newar 0.018 0.362 -0.433  0.062 0.381 -0.370        
 (1.007) (0.509) (2.461)  (0.977) (1.095) (1.750)        
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Variables 
A. OLS Model  B. Tobit Model  C. Two-Part Model 
All Remittance non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient All 
Remittance 
non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient All Remittance non-recipient Remittance recipient 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Condi. Mar. effect 
Condi. Mar. 
effect 
Condi. 
Mar. effect 
Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS 
Mar. effect Coeff. Mar. effect Coeff. Mar. effect Coeff. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
   
 
   
 
      
Ethnic Groups -Hills -0.979 -2.007** -1.053  -1.082 -2.259** -1.103      -0.276**  
 (0.629) (0.927) (0.978)  (0.691) (0.921) (0.956)      (0.113)  
Dalit 1.525** 0.995 0.772  1.757** 1.101 1.076        
 (0.726) (0.720) (1.276)  (0.767) (0.917) (1.263)        Development Regions 
              
Eastern  0.502 0.846 -2.257*  0.501 0.878 -2.491*  0.074 0.226*  0.428**  -0.187 
 (0.575) (0.599) (1.295)  (0.656) (0.702) (1.386)  (0.046) (0.130)  (0.184)  (0.198) 
Central  0.176 -0.191 -1.076  0.152 -0.241 -1.210  0.016 0.281** -0.019 0.434**  -0.005 
 (0.623) (0.772) (0.993)  (0.615) (0.663) (1.250)  (0.034) (0.121) (0.030) (0.180)  (0.155) 
Western  -0.661 0.049 -2.818***  -0.785 0.006 -3.120**  -0.074** 0.150 -0.131*** 0.286 -0.179*** -0.247 
 (0.587) (0.720) (1.054)  (0.601) (0.675) (1.201)  (0.037) (0.129) (0.046) (0.195) (0.062) (0.171) 
Mid-western  -0.425 0.289 -2.699**  -0.488 0.289 -2.979**      -0.159***  
 (0.692) (0.660) (1.321)  (0.601) (0.674) (1.186)      (0.043)  
Constant -21.328*** -17.567* -23.104***  -23.476*** -18.549** -26.218***   -3.606**  -2.622  -4.503** 
 (5.940) (9.326) (7.724)  (5.812) (7.555) (8.760)   (1.547)  (2.492)  (1.996) 
 
   
 
   
 
      
Observations 247 145 102  247 145 102  247 225 145 135 102 90 
Left censored observations 
   
 22 10 12  
R2/Pseudo-R2 0.42 0.42 0.59  0.11 0.12 0.17  0.56 0.44 0.65 0.35 0.63 0.66 
Log likelihood         -551.2 -308.5 -220.8  -32.79  -12.62  -13.56  
Note. The dependent variable is natural logarithm of one plus household expenditure on education to avoid missing values. The sample includes only the households which have children aged 5 to 24. Ethnic-Tarai and 
minorities is the base category for caste/ethnicity and Far-western is that for development regions.  
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity.  
*, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% level of statistical significance respectively. 
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Table 5.  OLS, Tobit and Two-Part Estimates of Budget Share (%) of Expenditure on Education (Household Level) 
Variables 
A. OLS Model  B. Tobit Model  C. Two-Part Model 
All Remittance non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient All 
Remittance 
non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient All Remittance non-recipient Remittance recipient 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Condi. Mar. effect 
Condi. Mar. 
effect 
Condi. 
Mar. effect 
Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS 
Mar. effect Coeff. Mar. effect Coeff. Mar. effect Coeff. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
   
 
   
 
      
Migrant household (M) 2.270** 1.383 2.533  2.159*** 1.322 2.661**  0.013 2.538*** -0.050* 1.678 0.275** 2.086 
 (0.991) (1.448) (1.645)  (0.805) (1.104) (1.245)  (0.028) (0.897) (0.027) (1.344) (0.119) (1.313) 
Log of household expenditure 0.373 0.344 0.748  0.682 0.488 0.987  0.119*** -0.505 0.180*** -0.709 0.254** -0.919 
 (1.293) (2.028) (1.947)  (0.942) (1.342) (1.439)  (0.038) (1.147) (0.057) (1.700) (0.100) (1.796) 
Years of schooling of the most 
educated adult aged 25 0.329*** 0.188 0.481**  0.303*** 0.154 0.533***  0.004 0.313*** -0.000 0.230* 0.016** 0.585*** 
 (0.110) (0.151) (0.221)  (0.093) (0.116) (0.172)  (0.003) (0.098) (0.003) (0.118) (0.007) (0.201) 
Log of household size 0.832 -0.530 -0.356  0.919 -0.169 -0.065  -0.041 0.215 -0.104* -0.942 -0.093 0.142 
 (1.211) (1.632) (2.228)  (1.017) (1.400) (1.574)  (0.042) (1.249) (0.054) (1.809) (0.077) (1.847) 
Proportion of children aged 0-4 -4.574 -8.171 9.806  -5.789 -8.946 6.741  -0.205 -0.578 0.235 -2.277  9.440 
 (5.724) (8.335) (7.463)  (5.430) (7.002) (9.055)  (0.164) (6.904) (0.191) (9.538)  (10.845) 
Proportion of children aged 5-10 22.773*** 15.378* 38.193***  20.510*** 12.857* 37.947***  1.423*** 18.226*** 1.748*** 13.040  32.193*** 
 (6.057) (8.619) (8.000)  (5.294) (7.029) (7.927)  (0.304) (6.514) (0.502) (9.070)  (9.768) 
Proportion of children aged 11-
16 15.864*** 10.785 28.205***  13.565*** 8.638 26.986***  0.279* 14.707** 0.453** 10.467 -0.369** 27.312*** 
 (5.471) (8.002) (7.332)  (4.911) (6.607) (7.383)  (0.165) (6.101) (0.185) (8.676) (0.162) (9.057) 
Proportion of children aged 17-
24 14.045** 10.160 18.740***  12.014** 7.866 18.194**  0.174 13.529** 0.549** 10.346 -0.925*** 21.941** 
 (5.552) (8.346) (6.469)  (4.987) (6.713) (7.293)  (0.178) (6.091) (0.215) (8.686) (0.209) (8.762) 
Proportion of working age men 
(25-64)  -2.609 -4.263 2.514  -1.944 -2.449 2.306  0.042 -4.528 0.467** -9.105 -1.086*** 0.965 
 (6.294) (8.605) (8.874)  (5.482) (7.444) (8.063)  (0.190) (6.796) (0.210) (9.542) (0.320) (10.059) 
Proportion of working age 
women (25-64) 8.885 6.861 13.712*  8.402 7.032 12.045  0.162 6.167 1.169*** 0.974 -0.256 19.130* 
 (5.648) (8.319) (7.939)  (5.767) (7.563) (9.026)  (0.188) (6.911) (0.399) (9.577) (0.345) (10.689) 
Constant -11.412 -4.456 -16.427  -15.939 -7.348 -21.416   3.990  11.398  0.769 
 (15.606) (25.583) (19.834)  (11.853) (17.093) (17.363)   (14.524)  (21.572)  (21.886) 
 
   
 
   
 
      
Observations 247 145 102  247 145 102  247 225 145 135 102 90 
Left censored observations 
   
 22 10 12        
R2/Pseudo-R2 0.29 0.22 0.52  0.06 0.04 0.12  0.56 0.23 0.65 0.24 0.63 0.37 
Log likelihood 
   
 -750.0 -445.7 -288.4   -32.79   -12.62   -13.56   
Note. The sample includes only the households which have children aged between 5 and 24. Similar to Table 4, caste/ethnicity dummies and development regions dummies are included in the models but estimates are 
not included for brevity and are available upon request. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% level of statistical significance respectively. 
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Table 6. OLS, Tobit and Two-Part Estimates of Natural Logarithm of Expenditure on Education (Children aged 5-24) 
Variables 
A. OLS Model  B. Tobit Model  C. Two-Part Model 
All Remittance non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient All 
Remittance 
non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient All Remittance non-recipient Remittance recipient 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Condi. Mar. effect 
Condi. Mar. 
effect 
Condi. Mar. 
effect 
Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS 
Mar. effect Coeff. Mar. effect Coeff. Mar. effect Coeff. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
   
 
   
 
      
Migrant household (M) 0.772** 0.343 1.355***  0.837** 0.400 1.503***  0.079** 0.122 0.049 -0.040 0.137*** 0.126 
 (0.301) (0.430) (0.482)  (0.327) (0.454) (0.522)  (0.031) (0.079) (0.041) (0.112) (0.044) (0.109) 
Log of household 
expenditure 2.747*** 3.060*** 2.258***  2.913*** 3.233*** 2.463***  0.231*** 0.692*** 0.255*** 0.717*** 0.170*** 0.744*** 
 (0.354) (0.508) (0.540)  (0.378) (0.535) (0.610)  (0.032) (0.095) (0.041) (0.138) (0.045) (0.128) 
Log of household size -1.814*** -2.526*** -1.405**  -1.904*** -2.639*** -1.458**  -0.162*** -0.403*** -0.232*** -0.557*** -0.092* -0.609*** 
 (0.373) (0.536) (0.618)  (0.399) (0.569) (0.676)  (0.035) (0.097) (0.049) (0.142) (0.056) (0.142) 
Child characteristics               
Secondary school age 
cohort (11-16) -0.450** -0.143 -0.796*  -0.463 -0.149 -0.825  -0.088** -0.040 -0.023 0.021 -0.175** 0.017 
 (0.224) (0.288) (0.415)  (0.330) (0.434) (0.519)  (0.041) (0.075) (0.051) (0.101) (0.070) (0.103) 
Tertiary school age 
cohort (17-24) -3.390*** -2.759*** -4.073***  -3.490*** -2.904*** -4.169***  -0.352*** 0.390*** -0.309*** 0.595*** -0.389*** 0.009 
 (0.358) (0.477) (0.570)  (0.355) (0.479) (0.571)  (0.034) (0.090) (0.039) (0.123) (0.059) (0.126) 
Male 0.756*** 0.671** 0.886**  0.818*** 0.703** 1.005**  0.052** 0.144** 0.052* 0.224*** 0.072** 0.026 
 (0.251) (0.323) (0.405)  (0.268) (0.343) (0.437)  (0.024) (0.065) (0.030) (0.084) (0.035) (0.092) 
Birth order -0.207 -0.453 0.566  -0.205 -0.482 0.665  -0.014 -0.269*** -0.036 -0.273** 0.060 -0.129 
 (0.328) (0.433) (0.524)  (0.338) (0.431) (0.566)  (0.033) (0.082) (0.040) (0.108) (0.051) (0.118) 
Parental education 
(maximum)               
Not completed primary 0.100 -0.107 0.829  0.197 -0.090 1.065  -0.045 0.272* -0.071 0.312* 0.014 0.292 
 (0.589) (0.773) (0.957)  (0.543) (0.708) (0.925)  (0.041) (0.142) (0.055) (0.188) (0.062) (0.210) 
Completed primary 1.468*** 1.330** 1.538*  1.700*** 1.492** 1.889***  0.077** 0.408*** 0.086 0.271* 0.067 0.674*** 
 (0.512) (0.669) (0.804)  (0.477) (0.639) (0.725)  (0.038) (0.121) (0.053) (0.162) (0.053) (0.163) 
Completed lower 
secondary 1.343*** 0.919 1.777***  1.510*** 0.971 2.119***  0.078** 0.468*** 0.056 0.456*** 0.119** 0.317** 
 (0.459) (0.655) (0.645)  (0.470) (0.654) (0.716)  (0.037) (0.118) (0.052) (0.166) (0.048) (0.155) 
Completed secondary 
and above 1.474*** 1.224** 2.092***  1.598*** 1.289** 2.388***  0.085** 0.513*** 0.089** 0.457*** 0.118** 0.588*** 
 (0.447) (0.594) (0.726)  (0.418) (0.533) (0.745)  (0.038) (0.106) (0.045) (0.138) (0.053) (0.160) 
Constant -22.707*** -24.697*** -18.456***  -25.728*** -27.593*** -22.309***   0.304  0.197  0.790 
 (4.034) (6.119) (5.819)  (4.308) (6.363) (6.564)   (1.083)  (1.633)  (1.385) 
 
              
Observations 605 364 241  605 364 241  605 484 364 295 241 189 
Left censored observations 
    121 69 52        
29 
 
Variables 
A. OLS Model  B. Tobit Model  C. Two-Part Model 
All Remittance non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient All 
Remittance 
non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient All Remittance non-recipient Remittance recipient 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Condi. Mar. effect 
Condi. Mar. 
effect 
Condi. Mar. 
effect 
Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS 
Mar. effect Coeff. Mar. effect Coeff. Mar. effect Coeff. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
   
 
   
 
      
R2/Pseudo-R2 0.38 0.38 0.50  0.09 0.08 0.13  0.42 0.40 0.41 0.43 0.53 0.55 
Log likelihood         -1436 -872.7 -550.7   -174.9   -104.9   -59.71   
Note. Dependent variable is natural logarithm of one plus expenditure on education for children to avoid missing values. Primary school age cohort (5-10) is the base group for age cohort. Non-literate or no formal 
schooling is the base category for parental education. Similar to Table 4, caste/ethnicity dummies and development regions dummies are included in the models but estimates are not included for brevity and are 
available upon request. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at residuals within each household. *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% level of statistical significance 
respectively. 
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Table 7. OLS, Tobit and Two-Part Estimates of Hours Spent on Study at Home during Last Seven Days (Children aged 5-24)  
Variables 
All Remittance non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient  All 
Remittance 
non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient  All Remittance non-recipient Remittance recipient 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.  
Condi. Mar. 
effect 
Condi. Mar. 
effect 
Condi. Mar. 
effect  Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS 
 Cond. Cond. Cond.  Mar. effect Coeff. Mar. effect Coeff. Mar. effect Coeff. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 (4) (5) (6)  
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
               
Migrant household (M) 2.372*** 1.057 3.478***  1.926*** 0.848 3.008***  0.057* 1.705** 0.024 0.835 0.129*** 1.410 
 (0.753) (1.044) (1.165)  (0.628) (0.869) (0.994)  (0.031) (0.727) (0.040) (0.995) (0.044) (1.157) 
Log of household expenditure 4.776*** 6.448*** 1.548  4.297*** 5.765*** 1.792  0.194*** 2.298*** 0.202*** 4.582*** 0.143*** -1.770 
 (0.900) (1.131) (1.538)  (0.723) (1.022) (1.158)  (0.033) (0.850) (0.047) (1.186) (0.044) (1.346) 
Log of household size -2.879*** -5.690*** 0.478  -2.607*** -4.988*** 0.074  -0.141*** -0.849 -0.185*** -3.669*** -0.082 2.951* 
 (1.085) (1.296) (1.922)  (0.766) (1.091) (1.285)  (0.035) (0.893) (0.048) (1.251) (0.054) (1.504) 
Child characteristics               
Secondary school age cohort 2.138*** 2.344*** 2.126*  1.473** 1.811** 1.338  -0.048 2.557*** 0.029 2.214** -0.146** 3.917*** 
 (0.702) (0.886) (1.182)  (0.631) (0.829) (0.983)  (0.041) (0.692) (0.055) (0.899) (0.067) (1.087) 
Tertiary school age cohort -3.981*** -4.027*** -3.611**  -4.222*** -4.197*** -4.107***  -0.327*** 1.808** -0.286*** 0.724 -0.364*** 3.524*** 
 (0.841) (1.067) (1.413)  (0.685) (0.924) (1.088)  (0.032) (0.836) (0.038) (1.101) (0.055) (1.341) 
Male 1.261** 1.947** 0.087  1.182** 1.669** 0.434  0.046* 0.415 0.051* 1.373* 0.063* -1.309 
 (0.616) (0.774) (0.997)  (0.514) (0.657) (0.831)  (0.024) (0.595) (0.029) (0.752) (0.036) (0.962) 
Birth order -0.482 -1.517 1.664  -0.425 -1.414* 1.563  -0.016 -0.635 -0.044 -1.409 0.071 0.842 
 (0.804) (1.016) (1.344)  (0.649) (0.828) (1.080)  (0.033) (0.756) (0.040) (0.959) (0.050) (1.256) 
Parental education (maximum)               
Not completed primary 0.371 -0.798 2.786  0.762 -0.385 3.030*  -0.002 -0.776 -0.050 -1.372 0.067 0.598 
 (1.176) (1.562) (1.870)  (1.040) (1.359) (1.764)  (0.042) (1.269) (0.054) (1.647) (0.062) (2.142) 
Completed primary 2.397** 0.052 5.624***  2.669*** 0.651 5.637***  0.085** 0.513 0.104** -2.078 0.070 5.126*** 
 (1.158) (1.378) (1.899)  (0.920) (1.229) (1.387)  (0.038) (1.117) (0.052) (1.444) (0.052) (1.724) 
Completed lower secondary 2.390** -0.109 6.118***  2.459*** 0.154 5.946***  0.079** 0.869 0.042 -1.109 0.132*** 4.041** 
 (1.132) (1.425) (1.811)  (0.905) (1.260) (1.366)  (0.036) (1.089) (0.049) (1.490) (0.047) (1.639) 
Completed secondary and 
above 3.351*** 2.515* 5.586***  3.103*** 2.256** 5.415***  0.087** 1.844* 0.075 1.421 0.136*** 3.665** 
 (1.010) (1.337) (1.778)  (0.805) (1.026) (1.425)  (0.037) (0.977) (0.046) (1.233) (0.051) (1.690) 
Constant -41.281*** -55.061*** -14.217  -39.938*** -51.471*** -20.157   -12.922  -35.128**  24.694* 
 (9.928) (13.821) (15.912)  (8.246) (12.159) (12.469)   (9.745)  (14.142)  (14.619) 
Observations 605 364 241  605 364 241  605 489 364 299 241 190 
R2/Pseudo-R2 0.25 0.30 0.29  0.05 0.06 0.06   0.14  0.21  0.26 
Log likelihood     -1848 -1114 -715.4  -174.3  -103.0  -59.37  
Note.See Table 4. Similar to Table 4, caste/ethnicity dummies and development regions dummies are included in the models but estimates are not included for brevity and are available upon request.
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Appendix A.1: Tobit and Hurdle Models 
The OLS estimates on educational investment may suffer from two major limitations. First, 
the estimates could be a corner solution outcome. Some households did not send their 
children to school at all, took their children out of school when they had completed a certain 
level, or made no expenditure on the education of children currently attending school. In 
those cases, the OLS estimates may be inconsistent (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 524). Second, the 
OLS estimates may be biased downward when a large proportion of sample households have 
a corner solution at zero (Deaton, 1997). However, we can consistently estimate the Engel 
curve using a Tobit model based on the assumption that the same mechanism drives both the 
“participation decision” (i.e., with zero expenditure on education) and the “amount decision” 
(i.e., the level of expenditure on education):  
HEDU�
∗ = β� + βHX� +  ε�                                (4A1) 
HEDU� = HEDU�
∗ if HEDU�∗ > 0 and 
HEDU� = 0  otherwise                           (4A2) 
whereHEDU* is a latent variable of the observed counterpart variable HEDU*, and εi is the 
error term. HXi is a set of explanatory variables (Mi, EXPi, Hi, Ci, and Di), which are the 
same as in Model (4). Following Wooldridge’s approach (2002, p. 522-523), the conditional 
marginal effect of an explanatory variable, for instance HXj, is as follows: 
��(����| ��,������)
����
= β�{(1 − λ(c)[ c + λ(c)]}     (4A3) 
where λ(c)=�(c)/Φ(c) is the inverse Mills ratio, c= HXβ/σ�,�(.) and Φ(.) are the probability 
and cumulative density functions, respectively, and σh is the standard deviation of the error 
term εhi. 
The Tobit model is too restrictive because it assumes that the same mechanism 
determines both the “participation decision” and the “amount decision.” In other words, it 
assumes that the effect of an explanatory variable on both the probability of positive 
expenditure and the amount of expenditure has the same sign. However, zero outcomes may 
occur owing to a lack of preference concerning education, while variation in the amount of 
positive expenditure may occur due to budget constraints. Therefore, we also use a hurdle 
model (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005; Wooldridge, 2002), which allows participation in 
education expenditure and the amount of education expenditure to be determined by different 
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processes or sets of variables. If the participation condition in equation (4A4) is satisfied, 
then the amount of education expenditure is determined by equation (4A5): 
HAVEHEDU�
∗ = β� + βHZ� +  u�                                             (4A4) 
HEDU� = 1[HAVEHEDU�
∗ > 0](β� + ΓHS� +  v� )            (4A5) 
where equation (4A4) is a probit model with latent dependent variable HAVEHEDU*. 
Equation (4A5) is estimated via linear regression truncated at zero (i.e., it is estimated using 
households that made expenditures on education). The dependent variable HEDU in equation 
(4A5) is the natural logarithm of education expenditure. The explanatory variables HZ and 
HS are specified in the same way as HX in Model (4A2), but their coefficients in equations 
(4A4) and (4A5) are allowed to enter with different coefficients. β andΓ are the vectors of the 
parameters to be estimated. The error terms ui and vi are independent of each other, as well as 
of HZ and HS. 
Appendix A.2. Household Survey Data and Construction of Variables 
We collected household data through individual interviews using a pilot-tested household 
questionnaire. The questionnaire asked about household demographics, income, expenditures, 
education, land, housing, durable goods and other real asset holdings, and entrepreneurship. 
Specifically, it captured detailed information about in-migration and out-migration (from the 
household’s hometown to other parts of Nepal and abroad). Data were collected at both the 
individual and household levels, depending on the nature of the information required. We 
complemented this questionnaire with a community questionnaire administered at the PSU 
level to capture information about the prices of major commodities, access to major facilities 
and services, such as schools, transportation, communication, health, banking, and financial 
services, and the overall pattern of in-migration and out-migration. The construction of 
income and consumption expenditure and the definitions of the variables used in the models 
are presented in Table A.1. 
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Table A.1Construction and Definition of Key Variables  
Variable Definition 
  
A. Income and Expenditure  
Household Income Wage or salary income, farm income, enterprise income, non-agriculture 
assets rental income or owner occupied housing, pension income, domestic 
remittance income and international remittance and income from sale of 
assets such as land, house, etc. 
Wage income Value of cash or in-kind earnings from daily, piece-rate and permanent 
employment 
Farm income  Value of crop and non-crop production that is consumed by the household or 
sold out and cash or in-kind received from tenants on farm share cropped-out 
or leased-out  minus costs on cultivation (seeds, fertilizers, hired labor, 
irrigation), fodder and other livestock expenses and cash or in-kind paid to the 
landlord 
Enterprise income  Gross revenue from enterprise activities minus expenses on wages, raw 
material, fuel, rent and other operating expenses during past 12 months 
Non-agriculture assets rental 
income  or owner occupied 
housing 
Earnings from renting out houses, no-agricultural land, and other real assets 
and imputed or reported value of housing that would have to paid to purchase 
housing services 
Pension Social security benefits provided by the previous employers or universal 
pension provided by the government 
Domestic remittance Monies or goods sent by the absent members of the households who are 
staying in other parts of the country during past 12 months 
International remittance Monies or goods sent by the absent members of the households who are 
staying abroad during past 12 months(excluding remittance received from 
friends and relatives) 
  
Household consumption expenditure Expenditure on food, non-food, durables consumption and expenditure on 
education (excluding expenses on health, festivals, marriage and dowry as 
well as expenses on purchase of land, housing, durable assets, jewelry and 
productive investments). 
Food  Expenses on foods purchased and the values of consumption of own-
produced foods within past seven days and annualized.  
Non-food Monies spent on clothes and footwear, tobacco, house rent or user value of 
housing, utilities such as gas, electricity, water and fuel and transport within 
past 12 months. 
Education Monies spent on currently school going children aged 5 through 24 including 
tuition fees, admission, exam and other fees, text books and stationary, 
uniforms, transport, private and other expenditure related to schooling within 
past 12 months. 
Durables services Value of the services flow from the durable holdings purchased at least 12 
months prior to the survey year which is computed based on the reported 
value of the durables during the time of purchase and it current value as well 
as inflation rate in the country. 
  
Per capita household income Household income divided by household size 
Per capita household consumption Household consumption expenditure divided by household size 
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Variable Definition 
expenditure  
  
B. Explanatory variables  
Migration  
Urban-native household (L) 1 if a households has been living in the PSU for a very long time or arrived 
other local administrative units i.e. village development committee (VDC) or 
municipality before or within 2001  
Migrant household (M) 1  if a household arrived in the PSU after 2001 
Years since migration (YSM) Completed years after arrival in the PSU 
  
Post Conflict migrant household 
(M0TO5) 
1  if a household arrived in the PSU after  conflict (2007-) 
Inter-conflict migrant household 
(M6TO15) 
1  if a household arrived in the PSU during civil conflict (1996-2006) 
Prior-conflict migrant household 
(M16TO20) 
1  if a household arrived in the PSU before civil conflict (1991-1995) 
  
Household size Number of people in the household including absent members 
Absent members of the household Individuals who lived in their home town less than six months during past 12 
months 
Maximum years of schooling of 
household members 
Years of schooling completed by the most educated member of the 
households among aged 25 and above 
Birth order The order of the child among the siblings multiplied by two and divided by 
one plus total number of siblings 
Maximum educational level of 
parents 
 
Illiterate Both parents having no formal schooling or cannot read or write (base 
category) 
Literate but no formal schooling No formal schooling but at least one of them can read and write 
Primary At least one of them having five years of schooling  
Lower secondary At least one of them having six to eight years of schooling 
Secondary At least one of them having eight to 10 years of schooling 
Tertiary At least one of them having more than 10 years of schooling 
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Table A.2OLS and Tobit Estimates of Natural Logarithm of Household Expenditure on Education (Household Level) 
Variables 
A. OLS Model  B. Tobit Model 
All No member abroad 
Member 
abroad  All 
No member 
abroad 
Member 
abroad 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.  Condi. Mar. Effect 
Condi. Mar. 
Effect 
Condi. Mar. 
Effect 
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Migrant household (M) 0.873** 0.281 0.921**  0.958** 0.324 0.981* 
 (0.340) (0.709) (0.457)  (0.396) (0.596) (0.517) 
Log of household expenditure 2.047*** 2.273** 1.973***  2.173*** 2.329*** 2.109*** 
 (0.465) (1.032) (0.564)  (0.463) (0.750) (0.604) 
Years of schooling of the most educated 
adult aged 25 0.117*** 0.070 0.147**  0.130*** 0.081 0.164** 
 (0.043) (0.085) (0.057)  (0.046) (0.066) (0.066) 
Log of household size 0.493 -0.400 0.650  0.572 -0.441 0.738 
 (0.483) (1.183) (0.570)  (0.501) (0.986) (0.655) 
Proportion of children aged 0-4 -4.483 -6.119 -1.083  -5.235** -7.464** -1.428 
 (2.838) (5.105) (3.260)  (2.648) (3.619) (3.740) 
Proportion of children aged 5-10 
8.188*** 6.437 10.017***  8.859*** 6.710* 10.979*** 
 (2.665) (4.812) (2.881)  (2.596) (3.671) (3.409) 
Proportion of children aged 11-16 
3.867 3.910 4.314  4.100* 3.795 4.704 
 (2.616) (4.683) (2.936)  (2.408) (3.327) (3.187) 
Proportion of children aged 17-24 
3.070 3.372 2.735  3.276 3.167 3.060 
 (2.405) (4.144) (2.629)  (2.452) (3.643) (3.162) 
Proportion of working age men (25-64)  
0.470 4.300 -1.391  0.611 4.537 -1.405 
 (2.874) (5.005) (3.991)  (2.692) (4.110) (3.559) 
Proportion of working age women (25-64) 
3.826 4.703 2.498  4.225 4.788 2.708 
 (2.440) (4.242) (3.131)  (2.849) (4.007) (3.906) 
Caste/Ethnicity 
       
Brahmin-Hills  0.447 -0.517 0.953  0.528 -0.504 1.106 
 (0.567) (0.847) (0.737)  (0.636) (0.948) (0.824) 
Brahmin-Tarai 0.133 -1.153 1.692**  0.147 -1.348 1.861 
 (0.622) (1.138) (0.796)  (0.923) (1.258) (1.323) 
Chhetri 0.272 -0.611 0.477  0.314 -0.615 0.556 
 (0.489) (0.789) (0.656)  (0.596) (0.934) (0.746) 
Newar 0.018 0.608 0.099  0.062 0.711 0.166 
 (1.007) (0.857) (1.348)  (0.977) (1.547) (1.238) 
Ethnic Groups -Hills -0.979 -2.860** -0.146  -1.082 -3.301*** -0.103 
 (0.629) (1.308) (0.780)  (0.691) (1.112) (0.850) 
Dalit 1.525** 0.445 2.033**  1.757** 0.557 2.344** 
 (0.726) (1.001) (1.009)  (0.767) (1.099) (0.989) 
Constant -21.328*** -21.814* -21.19***  -23.476*** -22.495** -23.646*** 
 (5.940) (12.935) (6.371)  (5.812) (9.249) (7.443) 
        
Observations 247 93 154  247 93 154 
Left censored observations 
    22 8 14 
R2/Pseudo-R2 0.419 0.555 0.425  0.108 0.165 0.109 
Log likelihood         -551.2 -192.9 -344.6 
Note.Development regions are included in the model but not reported for brevity. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% level of statistical significance respectively. 
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Table A.3Multinomial logit estimation for determinants of school choice among children aged 5–24 
Variables 
All   Remittance non-recipient   Remittance recipient 
Public 
School Private school   Public School Private school   
Public 
School 
Private 
school 
         
Migrant household (M) 0.757* 0.597  0.568 -0.112  1.752** 1.832** 
 (0.393) (0.439)  (0.573) (0.611)  (0.740) (0.871) 
Log of household 
expenditure 1.809*** 3.495***  2.022*** 4.216***  1.493* 3.374*** 
 (0.445) (0.537)  (0.706) (0.825)  (0.836) (1.019) 
Log of household size -1.168*** -2.285***  -1.115* -2.873***  -1.039 -2.479** 
 (0.448) (0.548)  (0.653) (0.830)  (0.868) (1.093) 
Child characteristics         
Secondary school age 
cohort -0.871 -2.688***  0.086 -1.393  -2.167* -4.491*** 
 (0.715) (0.750)  (0.989) (1.038)  (1.259) (1.355) 
Tertiary school age cohort -3.776*** -6.640***  -3.587*** -5.950***  -4.291*** -8.928*** 
 (0.697) (0.765)  (0.881) (0.976)  (1.329) (1.536) 
Male 0.447 1.146***  0.456 1.640***  1.137* 0.820 
 (0.302) (0.359)  (0.417) (0.499)  (0.593) (0.699) 
Birth order 0.182 -0.809*  -0.247 -1.254**  1.455* 0.549 
 (0.373) (0.448)  (0.498) (0.601)  (0.766) (0.902) 
Maximum education level 
of parents         
Not completed primary 0.341 0.247  -0.508 -0.419  1.006 1.557 
 (0.505) (0.726)  (0.772) (1.039)  (1.012) (1.395) 
Completed primary 0.620 2.100***  0.876 1.871**  0.485 3.522*** 
 (0.463) (0.625)  (0.709) (0.876)  (0.794) (1.141) 
Completed lower 
secondary 0.233 2.288***  -0.302 1.708**  1.242 3.649*** 
 (0.484) (0.611)  (0.675) (0.829)  (0.875) (1.120) 
Completed secondary and 
above 0.602 2.643***  0.428 2.452***  0.877 4.468*** 
 (0.430) (0.579)  (0.547) (0.754)  (0.949) (1.178) 
Caste/Ethnicity         
Brahmin-Hills  0.223 0.320  0.204 0.218  -0.104 0.369 
 (0.604) (0.705)  (0.999) (1.129)  (1.188) (1.310) 
Brahmin-Tarai 0.051 1.312  -0.849 0.916  14.368 14.199 
 (1.406) (1.400)  (1.699) (1.663)  (1,897.160) (1,897.16) 
Chhetri -0.965* -0.422  -1.297 -0.746  -0.801 -1.153 
 (0.559) (0.641)  (1.010) (1.103)  (0.880) (1.084) 
Newar -0.602 -0.605  -2.321 -1.789  0.657 -2.324 
 (0.894) (1.072)  (1.641) (1.683)  (1.401) (2.250) 
Ethnic –Hills -0.658 -0.582  -0.953 0.498  0.029 -1.984 
 (0.665) (0.762)  (1.155) (1.304)  (1.054) (1.261) 
Dalit -0.671 -1.480*  -0.768 -1.388  1.223 -1.711 
 (0.684) (0.858)  (1.094) (1.332)  (1.193) (1.494) 
Development regions         
Eastern  -1.063* 1.028  -0.945 1.578*  0.508 -0.158 
 (0.631) (0.742)  (0.839) (0.949)  (1.336) (1.696) 
Central  -1.377** 1.568**  -2.066*** 1.406*  0.726 1.358 
 (0.565) (0.674)  (0.751) (0.854)  (1.146) (1.492) 
Western  -2.239*** -0.083  -1.379 0.657  -2.076* -1.563 
 (0.595) (0.699)  (0.879) (0.999)  (1.118) (1.411) 
Mid-western  -1.659*** 0.418  -1.883*** -0.176  -0.473 0.316 
 (0.510) (0.636)  (0.670) (0.849)  (1.085) (1.411) 
Constant -15.865*** -36.080***  -17.840** -43.978***  -15.481* -34.062*** 
 (4.853) (5.962)  (8.147) (9.560)  (8.679) (10.782) 
         
Observations 602 602  361 361  241 241 
Pseudo R2 0.415 0.415  0.433 0.433  0.544 0.544 
Log likelihood -366.9 -366.9   -210.8 -210.8   -113.6 -113.6 
Note: No School (base category). Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the household level. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table A.4OLS, Tobit and Two-Part Estimates of Expenditure on Education 
(Consideration of alternative definition of migrant households, conflict-induced migration and temoral variation in investment in education) 
 Variables 
OLS Model   Tobit Model 
All Remittance non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient 
 All Remittance non-recipient 
Remittance 
recipient 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
 Condi. 
Mar. 
Effect 
Condi. Mar. 
Effect 
Condi. Mar. 
Effect  
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
A. Dependent Variable: Natural logarithm of expenditure on education (Household level)   
        
Prior-conflict migrant household (M16TO20) 
-1.474 -1.371 -1.999  -1.625* -1.432 -2.532 
(1.187) (1.555) (1.333)  (0.880) (0.906) (1.989) 
Inter-conflict migrant household (M6TO15) 
0.557 0.231 1.810**  0.597 0.255 1.966*** 
(0.366) (0.478) (0.690)  (0.444) (0.562) (0.714) 
Post-conflict migrant household (M0TO5) 
0.692 0.144 1.423*  0.760* 0.156 1.572** 
(0.438) (0.572) (0.814)  (0.459) (0.550) (0.714) 
Observations 247 145 102  247 145 102 
   
B. Dependent Variable: Budget share (%)  of expenditure on education (Household level)   
        
Prior-conflict migrant household (M16TO20) 
0.348 0.791 -1.930  -0.107 0.395 -2.387 
(3.218) (3.992) (2.646)  (1.805) (2.065) (4.138) 
Inter-conflict migrant household (M6TO15) 
1.209 1.280 2.594  1.184 1.150 2.973** 
(1.091) (1.775) (1.905)  (0.903) (1.276) (1.431) 
Post-conflict migrant household (M0TO5) 
2.315** 0.290 4.090**  2.195** 0.361 4.260*** 
(1.135) (1.495) (2.008)  (0.939) (1.258) (1.427) 
Observations 247 145 102  247 145 102 
   
C. Dependent Variable: Natural logarithm of expenditure on education (children age 5-24)   
        
Prior-conflict migrant household (M16TO20) 
0.145 0.148 -1.053  0.176 0.174 -1.075 
(0.822) (1.027) (1.807)  (0.770) (0.916) (1.670) 
Inter-conflict migrant household (M6TO15) 
0.948*** 1.136*** 1.142**  1.026*** 1.276** 1.190* 
(0.334) (0.421) (0.578)  (0.375) (0.517) (0.624) 
Post-conflict migrant household (M0TO5) 
0.715** 0.166 1.207**  0.812** 0.212 1.426** 
(0.354) (0.507) (0.570)  (0.389) (0.545) (0.602) 
Observations 605 364 241  605 364 241 
 
Note.The control variables are similar to Table 4, 5 and 6 for results reported in the Panel A, B and C respectively and are not reported for 
convenience. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticityin Panel A and B whereas these are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustered at residuals within each household in Panel C. *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% level of statistical significance 
respectively. 
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Table A.5OLS and Tobit Estimates of Natural Logarithm of Household Expenditure on Education (Household level) 
Variables 
OLS   Tobit 
All 
Having 
member 
abroad 
Remittance-
recipient   All 
Having 
member 
abroad 
Remittance-
recipient 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
 (4) 
   
 
   
 
 
Migrant household  
(migrated after sending member abroad) 
1.041*** 0.987** 1.293*  1.106** 1.041* 1.406* 
(0.354) (0.447) (0.691)  (0.539) (0.617) (0.746) 
Migrant household  
(migrated before sending member abroad) 
0.163 0.048 1.499**  0.185 0.054 1.680** 
(0.525) (0.605) (0.729)  (0.473) (0.538) (0.704) 
Migrant household  
(having no member abroad) 
0.295    0.329   
(0.449)    (0.504) 
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
Observations 247 154 102  247 154 102 
R-squared 0.416 0.416 0.588     
 
Note.A household is considered as migrant household if arrived in urban area after 1990 and urban-native otherwise. The results are 
qualitatively similar and robust to the usual definition of migrant household used in the paper. Control variables, similar Table 4 are 
included but are not reported. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level of statistical significance respectively. 
